I first heard about Harun (Vadim) Sidirov through the website http://islam4european.com/. I had only read a few sentences about him. After I started the Conservative Revolution interview series, I was thinking about the relationship between Ersnt Jünger and Abdülkadir Sufi and the questions about the identity of muhtedi, which were on the edge of my mind, when a friend of mine suggested that it would be good to interview him and I contacted him. We talked with Sidirov about conservative revolutionism, muhtedi, etc.

Let’s start by getting to know you. How did you become a Muslim?

This story is quite well-known in the Russian-speaking space, although it has also appeared in the English-speaking world. In the 1990s, as a teenager who had repatriated to Russia from one of the former Soviet republics, I became a Russian nationalist. At the time, my nationalism was fueled by resentment over the collapse of the USSR, which I now view as a natural process. This resentment spread widely across Russian society and the state. However, as a student by the late 1990s, I moved beyond nationalism and turned toward spiritual pursuits.

Initially, I rejected Christianity in favor of paganism and then explored European traditionalism. Eventually, I embraced Islam after meeting the Russian-Azerbaijani intellectual Geydar Dzhemal. My conversion to Islam in 2003 followed about two years of discussions with Dzhemal, a towering figure in the Russian-speaking Islamic intellectual scene. Dzhemal introduced me to a deeper intellectual perspective, and his engagement with both Western philosophy and Islam broadened my understanding of the world. He led dialogues with a diverse group of non-conformists, many of whom, like me, came to Islam through his influence. By that time, I wasn’t alone—there were many former Russian nationalists who had converted to Islam. Many others were interested but hesitant due to Islam’s association with non-Russian peoples and migrants. 

Converted Muslims are sometimes accused of betraying their nations by changing their religion. Recently, the concepts of German Islam and British Islam have been in the spotlight. You have also managed islam4european.com. In your opinion, how can converts overcome the identity issue? 

As cliché as it may sound, I don’t have a universal answer to this question. As an academic researcher of nations and national identities, I understand that the situation varies drastically depending on the context. It’s clear that when we talk about Western or generally non-Muslim nations, they were built on different principles and are at different stages of development. For example, in England, English converts like William Quilliam were able to openly practice and promote Islam as early as the late 19th century. By the late 20th century, entire communities of such individuals had already formed.

In Russia, however, for ethnic Russians (not to be confused with state-recognized Muslim peoples), this was not possible at that time, and it remains difficult even now. This disparity has contributed to the ongoing conflict between the National Organization of Russian Muslims, which I lead, and the Russian state.

So, in the broadest sense, one might say that in places where opportunities exist, if they don’t require compromising fundamental Islamic principles, it would be reasonable to make use of them. However, in places where such opportunities don’t exist, Muslims—particularly those from non-Muslim-majority nations—may need to seek out a different identity to reconcile their beliefs with their societal context.

What are the unique challenges that converts to Islam face in contemporary Western societies, and how can these challenges be addressed? How do you see the role of cultural and national identity in shaping the experience of Muslim converts in Europe?

One of the main issues converts face regarding identity is that they often find themselves in the position of being “outsiders among their own and insiders among strangers.” Sometimes this happens out of necessity, sometimes by choice, due to inexperience or radicalism. They often end up being alienated from their native community while not being able to fully integrate into the new one. When it comes to this new community, there are usually two different options: in one case, converts try to join an established Muslim community, often through marriage with one of its members; in the other case, they seek out a community of like-minded maximalists who reject any cultural identities and attempt to unite on the basis of so-called “pure Islam.” My associates and I, first through the National Organization of  Russian Muslims and later through the Islam4Europeans project, have always advocated for people with a common or at least similar cultural and ethnic background to stick together when they embrace Islam, thereby spreading Islam among their kin or members of related peoples.

European Muslims not to be afraid of being themselves and building their identity, like our African, Asian and other co-belivers do. This does not mean separatism – all these communities are part of a single Ummah, but if there is no movement that works strategically with all of them as we would like, we should at least take care of our community to effectively solve the problem for the Ummah in its direction.

Today, some Muslim minorities align themselves more with leftist and liberal movements because these movements provide them with more space. When we look at the relationship between Shaykh Abdalqadir Sufi and Ernst Jünger, it seems somewhat unconventional. A conservative revolutionary intellectual establishes a close relationship. When I spoke with a few people about this, they described him as a radical anti-Western thinker within Europe, even though they were not Muslim. Does Shaykh Abdalqadir fit the description of a “conservative revolutionary”?

The issue of alliances between Muslims in the West and left-wing or right-wing groups requires a separate, in-depth discussion, and again, the situation will vary in different countries. Nevertheless, there are quite a few examples of people from the right-wing adopting Islam, such as Claudio Mutti, Jakub Zaki, Ahmed Huber  and many others. As for Ian Dallas, known in Islam as Shaykh Abdalqadir Sufi, he did not come from the right-wing, but paradoxically, after embracing Islam, some of his ideas intersected with those of the European Conservative Revolution.

Such ideas include, for example, opposition to usurocracy, plutocracy, preference for personal rule based on the elite to bureaucracy and partitocracy, the concept of an order in the form of futuwwa, the idea of social corporations in the form of guilds, and so on.

Schmitt’s political theology, Jünger’s stance against modernity, and Sufi’s tasawwuf (futuwwa perception) perspective interact in their understanding of conservative revolution. Are there any parallels or conflicts in their understanding of crisis and transformation within the conservative revolution concept?

Of course, there are both similarities and differences in their ideas. However, since they are profound thinkers each of whom was the creator not of a single idea but of a complex set of ideas that evolved over time, any discussion of these ideas and their relationship must also be serious and thorough.

It should be understood that Schmitt and Jünger developed different topics, although they can be conditionally attributed to one, if not a school, then a culture of thought, namely rooted in the German tradition of the conservative revolution. At the same time, Schmitt was primarily a jurist in the broad sense, and secondly, a theorist of geopolitics, while Jünger was a social and existentialist thinker (also in the broad sense).