Within the European Right, the GRECE movement, founded by Alain de Benoist, led the most important debates of the period and deeply influenced subsequent right-wing currents. In particular, the emphasis on neo-paganism caught my attention. Alexander Raynor is an independent historian, translator, and writer who regularly contributes to Arktos Journal; he also serves as the editor-in-chief of the European New Right Revue (http://nouvelledroite.substack.com) published on Substack. We discussed the GRECE movement.

Could you explain under which historical, political, and intellectual conditions G.R.E.C.E. and the European New Right emerged, and which factors triggered this development?

The Groupement de Recherche et d’Études pour la Civilisation Européenne (GRECE) and the broader European New Right (ENR) emerged under specific historical, political, and intellectual conditions in post-war Europe, particularly in France during the late 1960s.

GRECE was offically founded in 1969 by Alain de Benoist and other French intellectuals amid several crucial developments: the perceived failure and collapse of traditional right-wing politics after WWII, the disillusionment following the May 1968 student protests, and the intellectual dominance of leftist thought in academic and cultural institutions. This period represented a crisis for traditional conservative thinking in Europe, especially following the discrediting of fascist ideologies after World War II.

The movement arose as a reaction to several factors: the cultural hegemony of progressive liberalism, American influence (“Americanization” or “globalism”) in European affairs (perceived as cultural imperialism), the processes of decolonization, and the rise of multicultural policies. The Cold War context provided additional impetus, as the ENR sought to develop a “third way” beyond both American capitalism and Soviet communism.

Intellectually, the movement was triggered by what its founders perceived as the inadequacies of post-war conservative thought to address cultural and identity questions. They believed traditional right-wing parties had become merely economic conservatives without deeper cultural or philosophical foundations. This intellectual vacuum prompted the ENR to reformulate right-wing thinking by drawing on diverse theoretical sources outside the conventional right-wing canon.

What aspects differentiate the European New Right from traditional or far-right movements? How do their intellectual foundations and strategic objectives diverge?

Unlike traditional far-right movements, the European New Right (ENR) is a self-consciously intellectual project that prioritizes cultural influence over direct political power. Rather than participating in party politics or engaging in populist agitation, it operates through think tanks, publications, and academic discourse, believing that meaningful political change is impossible without first achieving cultural hegemony. This strategic orientation, inspired by Antonio Gramsci’s concept of metapolitics, marks a significant departure from older right-wing movements that focused on electoral success or state power. 

Many right-wing movements have embraced Christianity as the spiritual cornerstone of Western civilization, the ENR is sharply critical of Christianity’s universalism, egalitarian ethics, and historical role in undermining pre-modern European identities. In its place, it promotes a revival of pre-Christian, pagan traditions as a more authentic expression of European spirituality, emphasizing heroism, rootedness, and cyclical conceptions of time. 

Strategically, the ENR is metapolitical—seeking to reshape the entire framework of public discourse, values, and intellectual assumptions. It aims not to seize power, but to define what power means, and in doing so, to transform the cultural and philosophical premises upon which modern Europe is built. This approach positions it not as a reactionary movement, but as a revolutionary one in the realm of ideas, challenging both liberal modernity and traditional right-wing authoritarianism alike. 

Dominique Vennner’s For a Positive Critique, can be viewed as a precursor to the birth of the political, or metapolitical, strategy of the ENR – abandoning the idea of coup de force (“power grab”) and concentrating more on the idea that a cultural revolution must first take place before a political revolution.

On what grounds was the “Right-wing Gramsci” or “metapolitical” approach—based on Antonio Gramsci’s concept of “cultural hegemony”—adopted?

The European New Right adopted Antonio Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony based on the recognition that political power ultimately stems from cultural dominance. This “metapolitical” approach was embraced on several grounds:

First, the ENR recognized that the traditional right’s focus on electoral politics had failed to prevent the cultural dominance of liberal and progressive values. They observed how leftist ideas had permeated educational institutions, media, and cultural production despite electoral defeats of leftist parties.

Second, Gramsci’s analysis of how ruling classes maintain power through cultural consent rather than coercion resonated with the ENR, which sought to apply this insight in reverse – to challenge liberal hegemony by first winning the “battle of ideas.”

Third, the ENR observed that direct political confrontation had become counterproductive for right-wing causes, particularly after World War II, when explicit fascist or reactionary politics became delegitimized – thousands were jailed or executed in les épurations (purges) for collaboration with the Vichy regime. Working at the level of culture allowed for more subtle influence without immediately triggering associations with historical right-wing extremism.

Finally, the ENR recognized the long-term nature of cultural transformation, adopting Gramsci’s “war of position” (similar to the idea of the “long march through the institutions”) as an alternative to the failed revolutionary tactics of postwar neofascist groups. This patient approach aimed to gradually transform common sense understandings of identity, community, and belonging.

We see this line of thought circulating through the political right in the Anglosphere with thinkers like Curtis Yarvin, Neema Parvini, and Samuel Francis – revisiting thinkers who sought to understand political power (de Jouvenel, Pareto, Mosca, Burnham, etc)

Why is neopaganism chosen over Christianity? What are the ideological and cultural reasons behind this preference?

Choosing paganism over Christianity is not just a mere difference in theological tastes. It is foundational to the worldview of the European New Right. I, and many others, have written extensively about the paganism of the ENR. The ENR’s preference for neopaganism over Christianity stems from several ideological and cultural considerations:

First, Christianity is viewed by ENR thinkers as a universalist religion that undermined Europe’s indigenous traditions and opened the door to other universalist ideologies like liberalism and communism (much in the same vein of thought as Oswald Spengler who once famously said, “Christianity was the Grandmother of Bolshevism.”) They argue that Christianity’s universalism, with its concept of a single truth for all humanity, contradicts their ethnopluralist worldview that each culture should maintain its distinct traditions.

Second, ENR thinkers like Alain de Benoist claim that Christianity introduced a dualistic worldview (good vs. evil, spirit vs. body) that is foreign to European thought and led to the “desacralization” of nature. They contrast this with pagan religions that they characterize as celebrating immanence, the natural world, and cyclic conceptions of time.

Third, Christianity is criticized for its alleged “slave morality” (borrowing from Nietzsche), which the ENR claims promotes weakness, guilt, and egalitarianism rather than the aristocratic virtues they associate with pre-Christian European traditions.

Fourth, the ENR views Christianity as a Middle Eastern import rather than an authentic expression of European spirituality. They advocate reconnecting with what they consider indigenous European religious traditions as part of their broader project of cultural regeneration and identity.

Fifth, the ENR views liberalism itself as a form of secular Christianity. American thinkers, such as Paul Gottried and Curtis Yarvin, have made similar arguments about the nature of liberalism in order to better understand its nature. Thus, opposition to Christianity is opposition to liberalism as well. 

Finally, the early Christian conversion of Europe is framed as the first colonization of the European mind, making deconversion to neopaganism a form of decolonization. This narrative allows the ENR to appropriate postcolonial discourse while focusing exclusively on European identity.

How is the concept of metapolitics put into practice? What kinds of initiatives have G.R.E.C.E. and the European New Right taken to bring this idea into public discourse?

European New Right activists have implemented their metapolitical strategy through various initiatives to influence public discourse:

First, the creation of intellectual journals and publishing houses has been central to their approach. Publications like Éléments, Nouvelle École and Krisis in France, Arktos, The Scorpion, American Renaissance, The Occidental Observer, and Counter-Currents in the Anglosphere, and Junge Freiheit in Germany have served as platforms for disseminating ENR ideas to intellectual audiences. These publications and publishing houses publish on a variety of topics in a scholarly or professional manner.

Second, the organization of conferences, summer schools, and cultural events has helped build networks of intellectuals sympathetic to ENR ideas. GRECE had regularly hosted conferences that bring together academics, journalists, and cultural figures to discuss concepts like identity, tradition, and modernity from perspectives aligned with their worldview.

Third, the ENR has engaged in strategic vocabulary shifts, redefining concepts like “diversity” to mean the preservation of distinct cultures rather than multicultural integration. This linguistic strategy attempts to appropriate progressive terminology while inverting its meaning. A perfect example of this is the “Metapolitical Dictionary” written by Guillaume Faye in his book Why We Fight.

Fourth, ENR thinkers have cultivated relationships with mainstream media outlets. In France, figures associated with GRECE gained positions at influential newspapers and magazines, such as Le Figaro Magazine, allowing them to subtly influence public debate.

Fifth, the development of think tanks and research institutes, such as the Iliade Institute in France, has institutionalized ENR thought and created spaces for developing and disseminating its ideas.

Finally, the ENR has expanded into digital media and online platforms, creating websites, YouTube channels, and social media presences that spread their ideas to younger audiences. There exists a massive grassroots effort by activists on a variety of social media platforms to disseminate ENR ideas. Utilizing social media has allowed ENR concepts to circulate widely beyond traditional academic and political contexts.

How have the ideas and strategies developed by the European New Right influenced right-wing parties and, in particular, populist right-wing movements across Europe?

The European New Right has influenced right-wing parties and populist movements across Europe (and the United States) in several significant ways:

First, many populist right-wing parties have adopted a form of the ENR’s concept of ethnopluralism, reframing anti-immigration positions as protection of cultural diversity rather than racial superiority. This rhetorical strategy, evident in parties like the French National Rally (formerly National Front), has helped mainstream previously marginal positions.

Second, the ENR’s critique of globalization and defense of local identities has been incorporated into the platforms of parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Italy’s Lega. These parties have adopted the language of “identitarianism” that draws heavily from ENR thought while applying it to mainstream political contexts. In the United States, the Trump movement has been leading the populist charge against globalization. Vice President JD Vance has on multiple occasions made arguments for the defense of some kind of American identity and has been strongly critical of the effects of globalization.

Third, the adoption of metapolitical strategies has influenced how right-wing movements operate. Many now emphasize cultural activities, intellectual development, and media presence alongside traditional political campaigning. Groups like Generation Identity explicitly acknowledge their debt to ENR thinking in their approach to activism.

Finally, the ENR’s critique of American cultural and political dominance (perhaps better understood as “globalism”) has been absorbed into European right-wing populism, with many parties positioning themselves as defenders of European civilizational values against both Islamic influence and “globalist” imperialism. During the Cold War, the ENR slogan was “neither Washington nor Moscow,” perhaps the new slogan of today’s ENR can be “neither Washington nor Mecca.” Though, sadly, many of the European populists retain some loyalty to Washington and instead direct their ire at Brussels (headquarters of the European Union). While not perfect, it is a step in the right direction – “neither Brussels nor Mecca” perhaps?

Finally, the ENR’s attempt to transcend the left-right divide on certain issues has influenced parties like the French National Rally to adopt economic positions traditionally associated with the left while maintaining cultural conservatism. This strategic combining of economic protectionism with cultural nationalism mirrors ENR theoretical innovations. You see this as well in the United States with the Trump administration practicing economic protectionism with its tariff proposals.

What is the relationship between the European New Right and the intellectual current known as the Conservative Revolution (Konservative Revolution)? How can we identify similarities and differences between these two currents?

Tamir Bar-On has stated in his research on the European New Right that it is a fusion of the New Left and the Conservative Revolution. I think that is a fair description, though, Bar-On is no friend of the European New Right.

The similarities include, first, a shared rejection of both liberal democracy and communist alternatives, with both movements seeking a “third way” political model rooted in concepts of community and cultural particularity rather than universalist principles.

Second, both movements share an anti-materialist orientation, critiquing the emphasis on economic concerns in both capitalist and Marxist thought in favor of spiritual and cultural regeneration.

Third, both movements position themselves as intellectual rather than directly political forces, focusing on transforming worldviews rather than immediate political action.

However, important differences exist: The Conservative Revolution emerged in the specific context of Weimar Germany and was more directly influenced by the experience of World War I and its aftermath, whereas the ENR developed in the post-World War II environment shaped by the discrediting of fascism.

The ENR has distanced itself from state-centered authoritarianism more explicitly than some Conservative Revolutionary thinkers, who often maintained more ambiguous relationships with fascist movements. In fact, many ENR thinkers can be understood as being pro-democracy, but not in the sense that democracy is currently practiced in the West, but as a more “organic” democracy.

Additionally, the ENR has incorporated postmodern critiques of universalism and postcolonial concepts of identity that were unavailable to the earlier Conservative Revolutionaries, who operated within more traditionally modernist frameworks despite their critiques of liberal modernity.